Stanley, J and Williamson, T. Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98(8) (2001): 411-444. Grimm, S. Understanding as Knowledge of Causes in A. Fairweather (ed. Given that the instrumental value is the same, our reaction to the two contrasting bypass cases seems to count in favor of the final value of successes because of abilityachievements. Fourthly, a relatively fertile area for further research concerns the semantics of understanding attribution. Questions about when and what type of understanding is required for permissible assertion connect with issues related to expertise.
The Oxford Handbook of Social Justice in Music Education [] Some of Pritchards (for example, 2009) earlier work on understanding uses the terminology atomistic understanding as synonymous with understanding-why and indeed his more recent work shifts to using the latter term. The notion of curiosity that plays a role in Kvanvigs line is a broadly inclusive one that is meant to include not just obvious problem-solving examples but also what he calls more spontaneous examples, such as turning around to see what caused a noise you just heard. Epistemology is a branch in philosophy that studies the nature of knowledge. Essentially, this view traditionally holds that understanding why X is the case is equivalent to knowing why X is the case (which is in turn supposed to be equivalent to knowing that X is the case because of Y). ), The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations. Rohwers inventive move involves a contrast case featuring unifying understanding, that is, understanding that is furnished from multiple sources, some good and some bad. A paper in which it is argued that (contrary to popular opinion) knowledge does not exclude luck. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. Baker, L. R. Third Person Understanding in A. Sanford (ed. Contains Kims classic discussion of species of dependence (for example, mereological dependence). A discussion of whether linguistic understanding is a form of knowledge. While Khalifa favors earlier accounts of scientific understanding to the more recent views that have been submitted by epistemologists, he is aware that some criticisms (for example, Lipton (2009) and Pritchard (2010)) to the effect that requiring knowledge of an explanation is too strong a necessary condition on understanding-why. Pritchards (2010) account of the distinctive value of understanding is, in short, that understanding essentially involves a strong kind of finally valuable cognitive achievement, and secondly, that while knowledge comes apart from cognitive achievement in both directions, understanding does not. Some focus on understanding-why while others focus on objectual understanding. The modern epistemology deals with the debate between rationalism and empiricism. His alternative suggestion is to propose explanation as the ideal of understanding, a suggestion that has as a consequence that one should measure degrees of understanding according to how well one approximate[s] the benefits provided by knowing a good and correct explanation. Khalifa submits that this line is supported by the existence of a correct and reasonably good explanation in the background of all cases of understanding-why that does not involve knowledge of an explanationa background explanation that would, if known, provide a greater degree of understanding-why. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. He suggests that the primary object of a priori knowledge is the modal reality itself that is grasped by the mind and that on this basis we go on to assent to the proposition that describes these relationships. That said, this article nonetheless attempts to outline a selection of topics that have generated the most discussion and highlights what is at issue in each case and what some of the available positions are. He wants us to suppose that grasping has two componentsone that is a purely psychological (that is, narrow) component and one that is the actual obtaining of the state of affairs that is grasped. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). Many of these questions have gone largely unexplored in the literature. Cases of intervening luck taketo use a simple examplethe familiar pattern of Chisholms sheep in a field case, where an agent sees a sheep-shaped rock which looks just like a sheep, and forms the belief There is a sheep.
Pros and cons of the epistemological shift - Ideal Term Papers He argues that we can gain some traction on the nature of grasping significant to understanding if we view it along such manipulationist lines. Is it a kind of knowledge, another kind of propositional attitude, an ability, and so forth? Offers an account of understanding that requires having a theory of the relevant phenomenon. Pragmatism as an epistemological approach accentuates the reasoning of theories and concepts by studying their consequences and goals, values and interests they support. In addition, Zagzebski supports the provocative line that understanding can perhaps sometimes be more desirable when the epistemic agent does not have the relevant true beliefs. This is a change from the past. Hills, A. Incudes arguments for the position that understanding need not be factive. Relatedly, if framed in terms of credence, what credence threshold must be met, with respect to propositions in some set, for the agent to understand that subject matter? Specifically, Hills outlines six different abilities that she takes to be involved in grasping the reasons why pabilities which effectively constitute, on her view, six necessary conditions for understanding why p. These six abilities allow one to be able to treat q as the reason why p, not merely believe or know that q is the reason why p. They are as follows: (i) an ability to follow another persons explanation of why p. (ii) an ability to explain p in ones own words. and Pritchard, D. Varieties of Externalism. Philosophical Issues 41(1) (2014): 63-109.
In particular, how we might define expertise and who has it. However, this concern might be abated with the addition of a moderate factivity constraint (for example, the constraint discussed in section two above) that rules out cases of mere intelligibility or subjective understanding). What is curiosity? This section considers the connection between understanding-why and truth, and then engages with the more complex issue of whether objectual understanding is factive. There is arguably a further principled reason that an overly weak view of the factivity of understanding will not easily be squared with pretheoretical intuitions about understanding. It is also becoming an increasingly popular position to hold that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge (see Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). One point that could potentially invite criticism is the move from (1) and (2) to (3). Khalifa, K. Understanding, Grasping and Luck. Episteme 10 (1) (2013b): 1-17. ), The Stanford Enclopedia of Philosophy. University of Edinburgh
epistemological shift pros and cons - erikapowers.com If understanding entails true beliefs of the form, So understanding entails that beliefs of the form. For example, I can understand the quadratic formula without knowing, or caring, about who introduced it. For example, an environment where ones abilities so easily could generate false beliefs of form
despite issuing (luckily) true beliefs of the form on this occasion. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. View Shift in Epistemology.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. Argues that requiring knowledge of an explanation is too strong a condition on understanding-why. This is because Stella lacks beliefs on the matter, even though the students can gain understanding from her. Zagzebski (2001), whose view maintains that at least not all cases of understanding require true beliefs, gestures to something like this view. With a wide range of subtly different accounts of understanding (both objectual and understanding-why) on the table, it will be helpful to consider how understanding interfaces with certain key debates in epistemology. Putting this all together, a scientist who embraces the ideal gas law, as an idealization, would not necessarily have any relevant false beliefs. For example, Kvanvig describes it as obtaining when understanding grammatically is followed by an object/subject matter, as in understanding the presidency, or the president, or politics (2003: 191). Should we say that the use of the term understanding that applies to such cases should be of no interest to epistemology? 2015 Jun;21(3):433-9. doi: 10.1111/jep.12282. Secondly, even subject matters that traffic in empirical rather than abstract atemporal phenomena (for example, pure mathematics), are not clearly such that understanding them should involve any appreciation for their coming to be, or their being caused to exist. While we would apply a description of better understanding to agent A even if the major difference between her and agent B was that A had additional true beliefs, we would also describe A as having better understanding than B if the key difference was that A had fewer false beliefs. Gettier, E. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6) (1963). Pritchard, D. Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value. Grazer Philosophische Studien 77 (2008): 325-39. DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. Scotland, U.K. A Weak Factivity Constraint on Objectual Understanding, Moderate Views of Objectual Understandings Factivity, Understanding as Representation Manipulability, Understanding as Well-Connected Knowledge, Understanding as (Partially) Compatible with Epistemic Luck, Newer Defenses of Understandings Compatibility with Epistemic Luck. Specifically, he points out that an omniscient agent who knows everything and intuitively therefore understands every phenomenon might do so while being entirely passivenot drawing interferences, making predictions or manipulating representations (in spite of knowing, for example, which propositions can be inferred from others). This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Although a range of epistemologists highlighting some of the important features of understanding-why and objectual understanding have been discussed, there are many interesting topics that warrant further research. Strevens, M. No Understanding Without Explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44 (2013): 510-515. Pritchard, meanwhile, claims that the matter of understandings compatibility with epistemic luck can be appreciated only against the background of a distinction between two kinds of epistemic luckintervening and environmentalboth of which are incompatible with knowledge. In addition, it is important to make explicit differences in terminology that can sometimes confuse discussions of some types of understanding. The Pros And Cons Of Epistemology - Internet Public Library Furthermore, Section 3 considers whether characterizations of understanding that focus on explanation provide a better alternative to views that capitalize on the idea of manipulating representations, also giving due consideration to views that appear to stand outside this divide. To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b). Looks at understandings role in recent debates about epistemic value and contains key arguments against Elgins non-factive view of understanding. In contrast with Pritchards partial compatibility view of the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck, where understanding is compatible with environmental but not with intervening luck, Rohwer (2014) defends understandings full compatibility with veritic epistemic luck (that is, of both intervening and environmental varieties). Contains exploration of whether the value knowledge may be in part determined by the extent to which it provides answers to questions one is curious about. The guiding task was to clarify what versions of historical epistemology exist and the pros and cons each of them presents. What is the grasping relation? For example, Kvanvig (2003) holds that understanding is particularly valuable in part because it requires a special grasp of explanatory and other coherence-making relationships. Riggs (2003: 20) agrees, stating that understanding of a subject matter requires a deep appreciation, grasp or awareness of how its parts fit together, what role each one plays in the context of the whole, and of the role it plays in the larger scheme of things (italics added). Running head: SHIFT IN EPISTEMOLOGY 1 Shift in Epistemology Student's Name Professor's Name Institution manage list views salesforce. Pros and cons of epistemology shift Changes in epistemology even though they have received several criticisms they have significantly played a critical role in the advancement of technology. And furthermore, weakly factive accounts welcome the possibility that internally coherent delusions (for example, those that are drug-induced) that are cognitively disconnected from real events might nonetheless yield understanding of those events. . For example, he attempts to explain the intuitions in Pritchards intervening luck spin on Kvanvigs Comanche case by noting that some of the temptation to deny understanding here relates to the writer of the luckily-true book himself lacking the relevant understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. reptarium brian barczyk; new milford high school principal; salisbury university apparel store This is a change from the past. Bradford, G. Achievement. Thus, given that understanding that p and knowing that p can in ordinary contexts be used synonymously (for example, understanding that it will rain is just to know that it will rain) we can paraphrase Zagzebskis point with no loss as: understanding X entails knowing that one understands X. The topic of epistemic value has only relatively recently received sustained attention in mainstream epistemology. (vi) an ability to give q (the right explanation) when given the information p. Wilkenfeld, D. Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (2013): 997-1016. Goldman, A. For example, Kvanvig (2003: 206) observes that we have an ordinary conception that understanding is a milestone to be achieved by long and sustained efforts at knowledge acquisition and Whitcomb (2012: 8) reflects that understanding is widely taken to be a higher epistemic good: a state that is like knowledge and true belief, but even better, epistemically speaking. Yet, these observations do not fit with the weak views commitment to, for example, the claim that understanding is achievable in cases of delusional hallucinations that are disconnected from the facts about how the world is. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. What (Good) is Historical Epistemology? | MPIWG Such a constraint would preserve the intuition that understanding is a particularly desirable epistemic good and would accordingly be untroubled by the issues highlighted for the weakest view outlined at the start of the section. In other words, one mistakenly take knowledge to be distinctively valuable only because knowledge often does have somethingcognitive achievementwhich is essential to understanding and which is finally valuable. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. Grimm (2014) also notes that his modal view of understanding fits well with the idea that understanding involves a kind of ability or know-how, as one who sees or grasps how certain propositions are modally related has the ability to answer a wide variety of questions about how things could have been different. Where is the Understanding? Synthese, 2015. However, Grimm is quick to point out that defending one of these two similar views does not depend on the correctness of the other. Epistemology is a way of framing knowledge, it defines how it can be produced and augmented. Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx - Running head: SHIFT IN The agents belief is justified and true, thanks to the fact that there is a genuine sheep hiding behind the rock, but the belief is not knowledge, as it could easily have been false. Early defence of explanations key role in understanding. Likewise, just as all understanding will presumably involve achieving intelligibility even though intelligibility does not entail understanding, so too will all grasping involve grasping* even though grasping* does not entail grasping. London: Routledge, 2009. Where should an investigation of understanding in epistemology take us next? However, Kelp admits that he wonders how his account will make sense of the link between understanding and explanation, and one might also wonder whether it is too strict to say that understanding requires knowledge as opposed to justified belief or justified true belief. In rationalism way of thinking, knowledge is acquired using reasons or reasoning. A., Kallestrup, J. Palermos, S.O. Kvanvig does not spell out what grasping might involve, in the sense now under consideration, in his discussion of coherence, and the other remarks we considered above. Therefore, the need to adopt a weak factivity constraint on objectual understandingat least on the basis of cases that feature idealizationslooks at least initially to be unmotivated in the absence of a more sophisticated view about the relationship between factivity, belief and acceptance (however, see Elgin 2004). Discuss the pros and cons of the epistemological shift in an essay Section 3 examines the notion of grasping which often appears in discussions of understanding in epistemology. There are three potential worries with this general style of approach. Email: emma.gordon@ed.ac.uk This is perhaps partially because there is a tendency to hold a persons potential understanding to standards of objective appropriateness as well as subjective appropriateness. There is a common and plausible intuition that understanding might be at least as epistemically valuable as knowledgeif not more soand relatedly that it demands more intellectual sophistication than other closely related epistemic states. security guard 12 hour shifts aubrey pearsons oaks husband epistemological shift pros and cons. This skeptical argument is worth engaging with, presumably with the goal of showing that understanding does not turn out to be internally indistinguishable from mere intelligibility. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. If this is right, then at least one prominent case used to illustrate a luck-based difference between knowledge and understanding does not hold up to scrutiny. To the extent that this is right, Zagzebski is endorsing a kind of KU principle (compare: KK). Since, for instance, the ideal gas law (for example, Elgin 2007) is recognized as a helpful fiction and is named and taught as such, as is, nave Copernicanism or the simple view that humans evolved from apes. Proposes an account of understandings value that is related to its connection with curiosity. body positive tiktok accounts; tough guise 2 summary sparknotes; tracking polls quizlet Consider a student saying, I thought I understood this subject, but my recent grade suggests I dont understand it after all. But is understanding factive? Endorses the idea that when we consider how things would be if something was true, we increase our access to further truths. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. It is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge (Rayner, 2011).The fact that taking in knowledge has altered is evident in learning institutions today. and claims that this goes along with a shift away from studying the cognitive subject's conceptual grasp of objects towards a "reflection on the . The cons of the epistemology shift that is a major - Course Hero Grimm thinks the metaphor involves something like apprehending how things stand in modal space (that is, that there are no possible worlds in which the necessary truth is false). View Shift in Epistemology.edited.docx from SOCIOLOGY 1010 at Columbia Southern University. Wilkenfeld suggests that this ability consists at least partly in being able to correct minor mistakes in ones mental representation and use it to make assessments in similar cases. However, Pritchards work on epistemic luck (for example, 2005) and how it is incompatible with knowledge leads him to reason that understanding is immune to some but not all forms of malignant luck (that is, luck which is incompatible with knowledge). Thirdly, Kelp (2015) has an objection that he thinks all who favor a manipulationist line should find worrying. The idea of grasping* is useful insofar as it makes clearer the cognitive feat involved in intelligibility, which is similar to understanding in the sense that it implies a grasping of order, pattern and connection between propositions (Riggs, 2004), but it does not require those propositions to be true. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Although the analysis of the value of epistemic states has roots in Plato and Aristotle, this renewed and more intense interest was initially inspired by two coinciding trends in epistemology. His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. Although a large number of epistemologists hold that understanding is not a species of knowledge (e.g. In fact, he claims, the two come apart in both directions: yielding knowledge without strong cognitive achievement andas in the case of understanding that lacks corresponding knowledgestrong cognitive achievement without knowledge. Riggs, W. Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding In M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski (eds. Lackey, J. Discussion of pros and cons Evaluates the epistemological shift, in the present or in the future, indicating whether the shift is good or bad. ), Knowledge, Virtue and Action. One issue worth bringing into sharper focus is whether knowing a good and correct explanation is really the ideal form of understanding-why. If Pritchard is right to claim that understanding is always a strong cognitive achievement, then understanding is always finally valuable if cognitive achievement is also always finally valuable, and moreover, valuable in a way that knowledge is not. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. His central claim in his recent work is that understanding can be viewed as knowledge of causes, though appreciating how he is thinking of this takes some situating, given that the knowledge central to understanding is non-propositional. This is a view to which Grimm (2010) is also sympathetic, remarking that the object of objectual understanding can be profitably viewed along the lines of the object of know-how, where Grimm has in mind here an anti-intellectualist interpretation of know-how according to which knowing how to do something is a matter of possessing abilities rather than knowing facts (compare, Stanley & Williamson 2001; Stanley 2011). Analyzes Kvanvigs Comanche case and argues that knowledge and understanding do not come apart in this example. The context-sensitive element of Wilkenfelds account of understanding allows him to attribute adequate understanding to, for example, a student in an introductory history class and yet deny understanding to that student when the context shifts to place him in a room with a panel of experts. philos201 Assignment Details Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. Intervening epistemic luck is the sort present in the Gettiers original cases (1963) which convinced most epistemologists to abandon the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. Pros and Cons of Epistemological Shift. Social Sciences - EssayZoo Elgin, C. Understanding and the Facts. Philosophical Studies 132 (2007): 33-42. Grimm (2012) has wondered whether this view might get things explanatorily backwards. So too does the fact that one would rather have a success involving an achievement than a mere success, even when this difference has no pragmatic consequences. epistemological shift pros and cons Morris challenges the assumption that hearers cannot gain understanding through the testimony of those who lack understanding, and accordingly, embraces a kind of understanding transmission principle that parallels the kind of knowledge transmission principle that is presently a topic of controversy in the epistemology of testimony. Attempts to explain away the intuitions suggesting that lucky understanding is incompatible with epistemic luck. Contains a discussion of the fact that we often take ourselves to understand things we do not.
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